Multiple causation is one of the most intricate issues in contemporary tort law. Sharing a loss suffered by a victim among multiple tortfeasors is indeed difficult and Courts do not always follow clear and consistent principles. Here, we argue that the axiomatic approach provided by the theory of cooperative games can be used to clarify that issue. We have considered the question from a purely game theoretic point of view in Dehez and Ferey (2013) . Here we propose to analyze it in a legal perspective. We consider in particular the difficult case of successive causation to which we associate a general class of games called "sequential liability games". We show that our model rationalizes the two-step process proposed by the Restatement Third of Torts, apportionment by causation and apportionment by responsibility. More precisely, we show that the weighted Shapley value is the legal counterpart of this twostep process.
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INTRODUCTION "Logic has not always the last word in law"
Chief Justice of the New Hampshire Supreme Court Robert Peaslee 1
Multiple causation is one of the most intricate issues in contemporary tort law. It arises when several tortfeasors cause harm to a victim entitled to recover it and when Courts have to apportion damage among them 2 . Many subfields in private law are concerned with apportionment issues: environmental law (several firms poisoning a river), medical malpractices (surgeon aggravating the consequences of a first accident caused by an initial injurer), health litigation (asbestos exposure by several firms through time), antitrust law (dividing the loss suffered by the consumers due to antitrust practices by several firms) etc.
Moreover, many models and theories have been proposed in law 3 , philosophy, economics 4 , and psychology 5 to capture the features of legal causation and apportionment issues. These legal debates lead the American Law Institute to promulgate a new Restatement dedicated to this issue. The present paper adds to this literature by developing a game theoretic approach in which damages are monetized and modeled as cooperative games where players are the tortfeasors who jointly created an indivisible economic loss to be paid. 7 Solution concepts are then applied following the axiomatic approach proposed by Shapley. Contrary to law and economics models in the literature, we are more interested in the fairness of the apportionment than in the incentives created by the apportionment rules. Therefore we 3 consider causation from an ex post perspective -once the damage occurred -and not from an ex ante perspective. 8 Contemplating the debates between legal philosophers and law and economics scholars on causation, the ex ante-ex post distinction could be said to be a summa divisio. On the one side, most legal philosophers interested in corrective justice criticize law and economics findings for its forward-looking oriented theory of causation and prefer developing some ex post criteria of causation; 9 on the other side, law and economics scholars, following Coase, try to show that causation is not the keystone of Torts as soon as the legal system seeks to implement optimal incentives. Dealing with causation in law and economics, Cooter (Cooter 1987, p. 523) . One of the findings of our approach is to show economic theory adds also to ex post causation theories and apportionment issues. Legal philosophy could learn from economic models of causation in an ex post perspective. Such models could then be developed to fill the gap between legal conceptions of causation and law and economic ones. This is one of the findings of the paper.
In the following, we distinguish with Posner and Landes (1980) successive joint tort and simultaneous joint tort, and we focus on a subset of multiple causation cases for the clarity of the exposition: the successive injury. The reason why we focus on successive causation is twofold. Firstly, these cases have specific mathematical properties; secondly, the counterfactuals needed to implement apportionment rules are more easily knowable than in simultaneous cases. Successive injury occurs when, after an injury caused by a first tortfeasor A to a victim V, the damage is aggravated by tortious acts from a second wrongdoer B, then from a third one C etc. A, B, C… are said to be the multiple tortfeasors because they cause together the final damage suffered by V. An example from the Restatement may illustrate 8 Our approach is more a retrospective causation perspective rather than a prospective causation perspective. According to Ben-Shahar (2000, p. 647 
) "Retrospective causation exists if, all else held fixed, but for the action the harmful consequence would not have occurred. Prospective causation exists when an action raises the probability of the harmful consequence. Thus, the distinguishing factor between the two types of causation is the time perspective of the evaluation. Retrospective causation is backward-looking, answering the counterfactual inquiry of whether the action was a necessary condition for the outcome. Prospective causation, in contrast, is forward-looking, answering the ex ante inquiry of whether the action increased the likelihood of injury".
9 As Cooter says, "Economic models of tort law are based on functional relationships among such variables as the probability of accidents, the harm they cause, and precaution against them. Being mathematical relationships, they are not explicitly causal […] ." (Cooter 1987, p. 523) . For a criticism of economic analysis of law related to ex post and ex ante perspectives on causation, see Wright (1985b) and Coleman (1992 Cooperative game theory is relevant for law and we aim to make judges and legal practitioners aware of the implicit logic they use to solve actual cases. Moreover, discussing apportionment issues on the grounds of an axiomatic method may be useful to achieve greater fairness and consistency in adjudication.
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
LIABILITY GAMES
Litigations about multiple causation are due to the fact that several tortfeasors have jointly caused damage to a victim. We begin by providing a heuristic presentation of our approach.
We then define liability games, with a particular attention to sequential liability, and introduce the concepts of core and Shapley value. Throughout this section, we illustrate our approach with 2 and 3 player's cases.
Heuristic presentation
Let us consider a situation where two persons are involved in damage whose monetary value D is known. A Court must allocate D between the two injurers. This determines the amount each one will be asked to pay. We will consider two cases. (1) (1,3) 
is the marginal damage of player 1 to coalition {1,2,3}.
Two players are said to be equal if they contribute equally to all coalitions to which they both belong. They are interchangeable. In the simultaneous case, all players are equal. In the sequential case, two players are equal if (and only if) they are consecutive and the first causes no immediate damage. For instance, players 2 and 3 are equal if and only if 2 0. d 
The core
The core of a game ( , ) Nv is a concept introduced by Gillies (1953) . It is the set of allocations that give to all coalitions at least what they are worth:
( ,..., ) ( ) and ( ) for all

No coalition receives less than its worth. In this sense, no coalition can formulate an objection against core allocations. In general, nothing insures that such allocation exists. Applied to a 3-player game, the core is the set of allocations 1 2 3 ( , , )
for all i, and
for all i  j. Equivalently, it is the set of allocations 1 2 3 ( , , )
Applied to a 3-player liability games, the left-hand sides are the potential damage of the individual players and the right-hand sides are their additional damage. Hence, the core is precisely the set of unobjectionable adjudications as defined in the introduction: each player pays at least his potential damage and at most his additional damage. In the simultaneous case, the core imposes no restriction: 0 i xD  for all . iN  In the 3-player sequential case, the core is the set of allocations 1 2 3 ( , , ) x x x such that:
Hence, the core of simultaneous and sequential liability games is always nonempty. We observe that unobjectionable adjudications satisfy a basic fairness principle: no one covers a 9 damage that has occurred "upstream" in the sequence. As a result, the first player has always to cover the initial damage.
The Shapley value
The value is a concept introduced by Shapley (1953) . For a given game ( , ) , Nv the Shapley value is an allocation rule that specifies for each player his share in v(N), defined as a weighted average of his marginal contributions:
The weights only depend on coalition size and are given by:
As such, it is just a formula, but it can be axiomatized. There exist several characterizations in the literature beyond Shapley's original one. 18 We retain here the alternative axiomatization due to Young (1985) because it is more appropriate within our context. Young proves that it is the unique allocation rule that satisfies the following properties:
Efficiency The shares of the players add up to the value of the game.
Symmetry Equal players are entitled to equal shares.
Monotonicity If a game is modified and the marginal contributions of a player do not decrease, then the amount paid by that player cannot decrease.
Efficiency is included in the definition of an allocation rule: the value of the game () vN is exactly distributed. Symmetry is nothing but the axiom of equal treatment of equals.
Monotonicity is a strong independence axiom:
what is allocated to a player only depends on his marginal contributions, independently of the other players' contributions.
Applied to a simultaneous liability game, no need for hard computations: by symmetry, the Shapley value imposes every players to pay the same amount. In the sequential 2-players case, we retrieve the rule (1) with equal weights: 12 1/ 2.
ww  In the 3-players case, we get: 1 3
This "triangular" formula easily extends to any number of players. 
This is again a triangular formula, with appropriate weighting. Notice that (4) Because weights are equal, the natural solution is to apply the symmetric Shapley value to the 2-player game restricted to the coalition {1,2}. The corresponding allocation is then given by:
The allocation that imposes to the first player to cover the entire damage D corresponds to (1, 0, 0 The definition of the Shapley value, weighted or not, is easily extended to any number of players: the triangular formulas (2) and (3) indeed extend to any n  3. It goes differently for the concept of unobjectionable adjudication. As mentioned in the introduction, it can be extended to accommodate more than three players by going from individual players to coalitions of players. Indeed, consider a core allocation x and a coalition . SN  By definition of the core, we have:
Combining these two conditions, we obtain:
Hence, core allocations satisfy the following inequalities:
Applied to liability games, they correspond to conditions C1 and C2: no coalition pays less than its potential damage, nor more than its additional damage. With this definition of unobjectionable adjudication, all that precedes carries over, in particular the equivalence between unobjectionable adjudications and weighted adjudications. Notice that C1 and C2 are equivalent conditions: an adjudication that verifies one, automatically verifies the other.
Alternative allocation rules
Before applying the Shapley values to the law, it is useful to consider other well-known allocation rules: equal division, equal surplus and nucleolus. Equal division is the simplest allocation rule:
Applied to liability games, it imposes to each injurer to pay the same amount. This rule applies naturally in the simultaneous case. In the sequential case, it is not appropriate because it does not take into account the relative involvements of the players in the occurrence of damage. Furthermore, it generally does not define an unobjectionable adjudication.
An alternative could be to impose to players to pay for their contribution to the total damage given by ( ) ( ) ( \ ).
Given efficiency, the resulting allocation rule, known as "egalitarian non-separable contribution", is defined by:
It coincides with the Shapley value in the 2-player case but is much different when more than two players are involved.
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Applied to a 3-player sequential game, the ENSC rule gives :   1  1  2  3   2  2  3   3  2  3   21  33  21  33 11 33
While it defines unobjectionable adjudications, it obviously leads to counterintuitive results: it fails to satisfy upstream independence and, moreover, a decrease in 2 d leads to an increase in 3 .
x Another well-known allocation rule is the nucleolus introduced by Schmeidler (1969) . In the spirit of the leximin criteria proposed by Rawl (1971) , it "minimizes dissatisfaction with priority to the coalitions that are most dissatisfied", to quote Shubik (1982, p. 339) . It has been applied to liability games in Dehez and Ferey (2013 
The nucleolus is an element of the core and it therefore defines unobjectionable adjudications.
However, as a rule, it violates upstream independence: the immediate damage caused by player 2 may affect the amount that player 3 has to pay.
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APPLYING THE WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUE TO THE LAW
Liability games formally defined in the previous section and their solution concepts are relevant to improve our understanding of the apportionment issue. More precisely, we have shown the relevance of the Shapley value and its weighted version, in relation to the core defined as the set of unobjectionable adjudications. As the cooperative games are less used in law and economics literature than the non-cooperative games, we further investigate the scope of our approach for the law from a normative and descriptive point of view. (Aumann 1985, p. 38) . In the following, we use the term normative in the second sense, the one of the judge.
The Shapley value as a normative tool
We have seen that the Shapley value is just one allocation rule among others. Therefore, why should the Shapley value be preferred to any other rule? Should a Court follow apportionment based on the Shapley value ? Here we rely on three major arguments to answer this question. Firstly, the properties of the Shapley value are meaningful for the law and need to be carefully examined to assess its normative content and acceptability; secondly, compared to other solutions, the Shapley value seems more relevant to correctly apportion damage among injurers in legal contexts; thirdly, normative statements in terms of game theory has to be compared with traditional law and economics criteria, namely the minimization of social costs.
Axiomatization of the Shapley value
The symmetric Shapley value is a fair compromise between tortfeasors 'concurrent claims. To see why, two arguments can be elaborated. Firstly, Shapley's formula is based on marginal damages. In this sense, the Shapley value is an evaluation of the degree of causation of each wrongdoing act 21 and can be considered as a useful benchmark to evaluate whether an injurer was strongly or weakly causally involved in the damage. Secondly, the axiomatic characterization of the value identifies its foundations as an allocation procedure, in particular efficiency, symmetry and monotonicity.
The law requires efficiency: damage has to be totally recovered by the victim and, at the same time, punitive damages put aside, the victim cannot get more than his damage.
Symmetry states that two injurers with identical marginal damage to all coalitions of which they are members should pay the same amount. Quoting Young (1994 Young ( , p. 1215 Consequently, zero immediate damage and upstream independence, together with efficiency, define a unique rule that coincides with the Shapley value of the associated liability game.
The argument extends to any number of players, starting from the last player and proceeding backward. 
Another reason why we insist on the Shapley value as a useful guide for the Court is due to the advantages of the Shapley value (2) compared to other allocation rules, taking into account the context: equal division, egalitarian non-separable contribution (4) and nucleolus (5). All three rules satisfy the weak property of monotonicity used to characterize the Shapley value in the general framework. Within the context of sequential liability games, a stronger monotonicity requirement is the following:
Strong monotonicity An increase in the immediate damage of a player should not reduce the amount paid by any player.
The egalitarian non-separable contribution rule (4) fails to satisfy that property. The following We face a trade-off between minimization of the social costs and fairness principles.
However, one step further could be proposed to file this gap 24 . As the different allocations belonging to the core -which are weighted Shapley-values -lead to different incentives schemes on tortfeasors, the minimization of social cost criteria could be used to choose among them. In other words, it would be acceptable to choose, within the core, the allocation that provides the best ex ante incentives in terms of minimization of social costs. This is a second best argument on which it could be possible to elaborate further a bridge between the ex post and ex ante approaches of causation.
The Shapley value as a descriptive tool
The solution concepts in cooperative game theory should not only be understood as normative tools to guide a Court. They also provide a framework to better understand existing norms and Courts' decisions. 25 Many others cases and litigations are covered by our model: enhanced injury, background conditions, victim's contribution and also some nuisances or product liability cases. In these issues, a common mathematical structure can be identified once the different tortfeasors (including the victim) follow a temporal chain of causality: in these cases, tortious acts of the tortfeasor i are a physical cause of "direct" damage d i and a proximate or legal cause of the aggravated damages up in the liability sequence (the enhanced injuries d j with j > i). We provide further examples of these different kinds of litigation. Thereafter, all these cases will be named "successive injury cases".
Successive accident cases.
In Maddux, the first tortfeasor hits the plaintiff's car and thirty second later, a second driver hits the car and causes other injury. The causal events are so close that the chain of injuries was considered by the Court as a single case.
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Background conditions. In Steinhauser, the Court had to adjudicate a case where the tortious act of the defendant had caused a "chronic schizophrenic reaction" from the plaintiff. 29 The Court held that the defendants could explore the possibility of the plaintiff having developed schizophrenia regardless of the accident.
Victim's contribution. In Prospectus Alpha Navigation Co, the plaintiff's ship was tied up at the defendant's dock. 30 Because of a negligent tortious act of the plaintiff's crew, the ship caught fire. However, the defendant was also negligent: he sent the plaintiff's ship away before the fire being completely extinguished. Then, the fire caused further damage. In Dillon, a young boy was on a high beam of a bridge trestle. He lost his balance and was falling to the rocks when he grabbed the electric wires, negligently exposed by the defendant, which killed him. Product liability. In Hillrichs, the Court considered that a jury could evaluate the extent of the enhanced injury. 32 A corn-harvesting machine was not equipped with an emergency stop device and the plaintiff lost his fingers after his hand had been entangled in. The Court considered that some evidence showed that the injury would have been different with a stop emergency device. In Reed, the plaintiff's was involved in a car accident in which the shattering of the fiberglass top of his car hurts his arm. 33 The expert testified that such injury would have been avoided by a metal top. The Court considered that estimation of the enhanced damages was possible.
The Restatement and the weighted Shapley value
The usefulness of the Shapley value to better understand apportionment principles in law may be systematized. One of the innovations proposed by the Third Restatement compared to the First or the Second is a "two-step process" to apportion damage among tortfeasors. 34 The method provides a unified framework taking account the different issues: causation, degree of responsibility, divisibility, inconsistent verdicts etc. First, the Restatement states that the damage must be divided by causation when it is possible to assign to one tortfeasor or to subsets of tortfeasors the part of the damage this subset has caused alone. 36 The characteristic function of a liability game provides such a division of damage. Reciprocally, the factfinder or the jury instructed by a Court to divide the damage seeking to assign to each subset of tortfeasors the damage they would have caused alone, defines a characteristic function.
Sometimes, the task is easy because the aggravated damages d i are perfectly observable;
sometimes, a counterfactual is needed. 42 , the core of a 3-player liability game is the subset of 37 We rely on the classical distinction between prospective causation and retrospective one, see note 8 supra. 38 Dillon v. Twin State Gas & Electric Co., 163 Atl. 1ll (N.H.1932) . 39 Obviously, if the boy had not lost his balance, the tortious act would have not been damageable. On the contrary, if the electric company had not been negligent, a less important damage would have occurred. The key-element the factfinder has to know is whether the boy had already lost his balance before grabbing the electric wires or not. (Peaslee 1934 (Peaslee , p.1134 (Peaslee -1135 S. 227, 236 (1933) . We do not deal with punitive damages and we consider that Courts are able to calculate the full amount of damage to be paid to the victim. A priori, our argument does not depend on the methods actually used by Courts to calculate damages except if the calculation leads to non-monotonicity: it could be the case, for example, when a first tortfeasor causes a disease to the victim, following by a second tortfeasor who causes death and compensation for death be less important than compensation for disease. Offsetting benefits are therefore excluded, see Porat, and Posner (2014) .
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allocations that verify two conditions ("non-objectionable adjudications"). The first one is that the contribution of any subset of tortfeasors should be at least equal to the damage they would have caused without the intervention of the others. The second one is that no group of tortfeasors should pay more than what it has caused. Law and legal doctrine acknowledge the importance of these two restrictions to consistently apportion liability. Saying that no tortfeasor should pay more than he has caused is a legal translation of the condition C2 in our game. 43 Legal principles and economic conditions converge.
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However, most of the times, apportionment by causation is insufficient to define a unique apportionment of the damage (in mathematical terms, the core typically contains many allocations v. Cash & Carry Bldg. Center, Inc., 359 A.2d 193 (N.H. 1976 ), Prospectus Alpha Navigation Co v. North Pacific Grain Growers, Inc., 767 F. 2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1986 
The legal issue is to solve the transferable utility game (N,v): the initial damage is entirely paid by D since he is the only cause of this part of the damage and the enhanced injury is shared between the two tortfeasors by assigning to each of them a degree of responsibility, say w D et w M , knowing that the sum equals 100%. Then the payment due by each tortfeasor from this two-step process is exactly the weighted Shapley value associated to the game (N,v).
CONCLUDING REMARKS
To conclude, we develop further comments and propose possible extensions beyond the sequential liability models.
Firstly, the model covers a wide range of cases and provides a better "comprehension" of them. By comprehension, we mean that our model defines as a class of games covering a large variety of cases and identifies the common structure that lies behind them. In other words, it identifies a common mathematical structure unifying all liability litigations. It is therefore interesting to know whether Courts use a common rule to apportion damage among tortfeasors.
Applied to sequential situations, the aim of the Restatement is precisely to provide such a general method, and we have shown this method is deeply justified in terms of rationality as soon as it appears as the implementation of a weighted Shapley value scheme.
Secondly, one of the main implications of our findings is the relationships between axiomatic reasoning, rationality and legal adjudication: by using an axiomatic method to determine the shares paid by each tortfeasor and by characterizing different solutions in terms of axioms, the discussion about the best way to apportion damage among tortfeasors is improved in terms of impartiality and rationality. By unicity, acceptance of an apportionment derived from a particular rule is equivalent to acceptance of the underline axioms. One step further would be to determine the incentive effects of the implementation of a Shapley value to make clearer the trade-off between fairness and minimization of social costs.
Thirdly, and more importantly, it is possible to extend our approach to cover other types of multiple causation cases, leading to different liability games. That requires the understanding of the structure of the multiple causation at stake. For instance, one possible extension deals with over determination cases or preemptive causation that lead to paradoxical conclusions in legal theory. Consider the famous example of two fires that jointly destroy a house. A strict "but for test" would lead to consider that none of the fire is a cause since the damage would have occurred anyway. Tortfeasors have already argued that they have no obligation to compensate the victim insofar as the causal link is missing. Referring to potential damages, the characteristic function is given by v(12) = v(1) = v(2) = D. 47 This game admits no core allocation i.e. there exists no unobjectionable adjudication. However, the symmetric Shapley value is well-defined: the players being interchangeable, it produces the equal division (D/2, D/2).
Regarding information, as our approach is based on ex post causation, coalitions have to be understood as counterfactual states of the world (the state of the world that would have occurred, all things being equal, if one agent had not tortuously acted). In the sequential liability game, this task is simple and actually requires little information (only n numbers, the d i , which often are perfectly observable). In other cases, it could be difficult to precisely identify the counterfactual states of the world. Take for instance the asbestos cases. Such a litigation leads to apportionment issues either among several firms that have exposed the victim to asbestos products or among different insurance companies that have covered the risk for a single injurer at different periods of time. Several apportionment principals have been proposed. 48 As the sequential liability game, asbestos cases have a temporal structure because the disease is due to cumulated past exposure. However, asbestos cases do not share the sequential feature of our model insofar as removing an injurer i from the causality sequence does not prevent the injurers down in the sequence from increasing the expected damage, i.e. the final risk of disease. Therefore, once Courts have considered these injurers are together the cause of the disease, assigning to each coalition its value is more difficult and requires information on the risk level created by each one of the coalitions. One way could be to use the epidemiologic models describing the relationships between probability of disease and length of exposures in order to have an idea of the counterfactual states of the world. The best proxies for the counterfactuals here would be the expected damages of each coalition.
48 See Owens- Illinois, Inc. v. United Insurance Co, 138 N.J. 437 (1994) "because multiple policies of insurance are triggered under the continuous-trigger theory, it becomes necessary to determine the extent to which each triggered policy shall provide indemnity […] " (title VII). Court then discusses different rules that could be used to apportion the responsibility between firms and/or insurance companies.
